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Abstract– Mobility architectures that place complexity in
end nodes rather than in the network interior have many advan-
tageous properties and are becoming popular research topics.
Such architectures typically push mobility support into higher
layers of the protocol stack than network layer approaches like
Mobile IP. The literature is ripe with proposals to provide mo-
bility services in the transport, session, and application layers.
In this paper, we focus on a mobility architecture that makes
the most significant changes to the transport layer. A com-
mon problem amongst all mobility protocols at various layers
is location management, which entails translating some form
of static identifier into a mobile node’s dynamic location. Lo-
cation management is required for mobile nodes to be able to
provide globally-reachable services on-demand to other hosts.
In this paper, we describe the challenges of location manage-
ment in a transport layer mobility architecture, and discuss the
advantages and disadvantages of various solutions proposed in
the literature. Our conclusion is that, in principle, secure dy-
erational limitations. We note that this topic has room for fur-
ther exploration, and we present this paper largely as a starting
point for comparing possible solutions.
1. INTRODUCTION
In the Internet, each host interface has an IP address which
represents some point on the network topology. Routing a
packet destined for some IP address is accomplished by match-
ing longer and longer prefixes of the destination address in the
distributed routing table. This system works well enough for
static hosts, but was not specifically designed to accommodate
mobile hosts. When a mobile host moves, changing its point
of attachment to the Internet, it requires a new IP address for
packets to be routed to its new location.
Since IP addresses are only ephemerally useful as host iden-
tifiers, some service is required to provide more permanent
host identifiers and map these into current host locations at
any given time. We call this service location management.
The literature documents a vast number of proposed mobil-
ity architectures which deal with the split between permanent
identifiers and temporal locations (IP addresses) in many dif-
ferent ways. The common goal is to allow users and applica-
tions to use permanent identifiers to refer to hosts, and hide
any complexity of the location mapping within the mobility
architecture.
Mobile IP [23] hides this distinction by allowing a mobile
node to be reachable at a static “home address.” This is accom-
plished using a second “care-of address” that identifies a mo-
bile host’s current location. A “home agent” is placed within
the topological area that the mobile node’s home address im-
plies. The home agent acts as an indirection point, tunneling
packets arriving for the home address to the care-of address.
In this mobility architecture, location management is provided
by keeping the home agents updated with present care-of ad-
dresses for the mobile nodes. The permanent identifier for use
by users and applications is simply the home address.
Alternatively, some mobility architectures (describing them-
selves as transport, session, or application layer approaches)
have no concept of a home IP address, but instead use other
permanent identifiers for mobile nodes. Depending on the
architecture, these identifiers might be things like a name in
the DNS system, a SIP address, or even a cryptographically-
generated binary string. Users and applications that wish to
contact a mobile host in this type of architecture must first use
the appropriate means to resolve its permanent identifier into
a current IP address.
The impermanence of IP addresses as host identifiers makes
using permanent identifiers that are not IP addresses advanta-
geous. For many machines on the Internet, IP addresses are
dynamically obtained from a service provider using DHCP.
These addresses are only temporary and often change, even
when the end host is stationary. While this does not prevent
them from using Mobile IP, it does prevent others from using
the constantly changing IP address as a locator. Using raw IP
addresses as permanent locators also only works when hosts
have a “home network” for a home agent to be placed on.
For many mobile devices, there may be no clear home net-
work willing to take on this administrative burden and spare
a permanent IP address from their finite pool. In addition,
structural changes in organizations like businesses or universi-
ties can result in network operators readdressing network seg-
ments. While this may happen relatively infrequently in gen-
eral, renumbering is not uncommon in many organizations and
service providers. Dynamic host readdressing, as a privacy
measure, is a proposed part of IPv6 and allows hosts to alter
their address over time [20]. Thus, renumbering may become
more prevalent as networks transition to IPv6.
The Mobile IP approach forces home agents into the net-
work infrastructure. This makes networks at least slightly more
difficult to configure, maintain, and troubleshoot. If every
new feature had similar impositions, the utility of the network
could be degraded. As conscientious architects, we try to avoid
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requiring additional infrastructure when possible. If non-IP
address identifiers are used, we can move the support for stor-
age and lookup of mappings outside the network and into ei-
ther end-systems or existing network services (e.g. DNS).
While not routable, identifiers that are not IP addresses may
be considerably more expressive, and more directly usable for
higher layer functions above routing. For instance, IP ad-
dresses are convenient for machines to work with, but not par-
ticularly natural for humans. It is much easier for people to
remember a text string identifier like www.nasa.gov than
the corresponding 32-bit IPv4 or 128-bit IPv6 address that
DNS maps that name to. Systems like DNS allow us to em-
bed meaningfulness in a identifier which are self-descriptive
and more portable between humans (in conversation, adver-
tisements, etc) than raw numeric IP addresses.
In a Mobile IP system, host mobility is hidden from all
layers above IP. This is somewhat beneficial to higher layers,
which can operate without needing any modifications to sup-
port mobility. However, some higher layer protocols and be-
haviors are built on the assumption of a static path. In this case,
hiding mobility from them is a mistake. For instance, security
policies for a host that is connected in one network might vary
widely from policies that the user may expect or prefer from
other networks. Common congestion control algorithms [1, 8]
assume a fairly consistent path, which is fallacious assumption
for many mobility scenarios. Some types of content might also
be adjusted depending on a host’s location, such as providing
more pertinent local information (news, weather) or adjusting
codecs or content items to better suit path properties like ca-
pacity, delay, loss rate, and jitter.
With similar motivations in mind, the literature contains
several proposals for mobility systems that do not use IP ad-
dresses as permanent identifiers. Some of these do not provide
permanent host identifiers at all, focusing only on maintaining
existing connections across mobility events, while others are
based entirely on the notion of separating IP addresses (loca-
tions) from host identities [21]. Notably, several systems ex-
ist for making transport layer protocols robust to changes in a
host’s network connection point and underlying IP address and
routing changes, without requiring network layer support. For
example, such systems have been proposed for TCP [26, 11, 5,
18, 3], UDP [4], SCTP [10, 15, 2], and DCCP [16]. We refer
to these as transport layer mobility extensions, as they place
the burden of mobility support primarily in the transport layer,
with much less significant protocol changes to other layers.
Amongst these transport layer mobility systems, we can iden-
tify some common functions replicated between designs. Move-
ment detection is needed to identify when a network transition
has taken place and reconfigure the mobile host’s addressing
and routing for the new network. Binding updates are per-
formed to update the address binding of existing transport con-
nections, and a location management function maintains the
mobile node’s reachability for new connections. These are
common functions that we find in most instances of what we
consider to be transport layer mobility work, and we are at-
tempting to define a common transport layer mobility archi-
tecture that can unify these approaches within a single frame-
work [9]. This allows for redundant actions like movement de-
tection and location management to be performed by a single
module, since they are transport independent, and leave each
transport layer mobility scheme to only need to provide bind-
ing updates. This makes both development and deployment of
such protocols easier by narrowing the scope of problems they
have to solve and minimizing the code additions and modifi-
cations required.
In this paper, we specifically discuss location management
within the transport layer mobility architecture. Different mo-
bility schemes have suggested various means for location man-
agement, and we independently evaluate and compare several
of these. Section 3 discusses dynamic DNS, section 4 explores
SIP, section 5 examines reliable server pooling, and section 6
covers connection-splitting approaches. Section 2 motivates
why we’ve picked these particular methods to look at, and how
we evaluate them.
2. GOALS
We have a number of goals for the location management
subsystem of the transport layer mobility architecture. We de-
scribe some of the most important desires in this section, and
in subsequent sections, discuss how each proposed location
management solution meets or fails with regards to them.
We mostly consider only protocols that have been published
in specifications by the IETF, as these are generally easier to
obtain, implement, and deploy than the works of other stan-
dards bodies. We at least want to use protocols that are rela-
tively consistent with the existing standards. The connection-
splitting approaches that this document considers are not nec-
essarily required to be “standards” as they do not change the
wire-format of the protocol or its interoperability. The ideo-
logical questionability of connection-splitting practices within
the traditional Internet design principles is temporarily ignored
here.
2.1 Minimal Required Infrastructure or
Architectural Changes
One of our most important goals is to reuse existing network
infrastructure as much as possible and avoid requiring the de-
ployment of new services or new support nodes. Additionally,
we want to change the stack architecture as little as possible.
That is, we would like IP to remain as small and simple a layer
as possible, and we would like the interface between applica-
tions and the location manager to be as close to the current
lookup system calls as possible. We especially rule out solu-
tions that would require adding layers to the stack, as they may
adversely affect interactions between the layers they displace.
It would be possible to use the existing Mobile IP technol-
ogy for location management, and at the same time update
transport bindings to use topologically correct addresses for
their current locations, handle soft handovers, etc [14]. How-
ever, we specifically do not consider this approach within the
transport layer mobility architecture. Requiring Mobile IP
support in end-hosts and home agents within the network is
against our principle of avoiding network infrastructure and
imposing possibly ill-fitting concepts like that of a “home net-
work” upon end users.
Specifically, we do not consider the Host Identity Proto-
col (HIP) [21] for location management either. Although HIP
solves the fundamental problem of separating a host’s location
from its identity, it is unsuitable for our purposes for a couple
of reasons. First, HIP requires other architectural changes like
rendezvous servers, and IPsec support, which we wish to avoid
imposing on the network. Also, HIP can hide mobility from
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higher layers and cause the related problems explained in the
previous section.
Within the transport layer mobility architecture, we attempt
to create a mobility solution that places as much of the support
burden outside of the network and into end hosts. If users de-
sire mobility support, then they should be able to install soft-
ware and instantly have mobility support, without requiring
network managers and operators to upgrade or modify their
equipment and configurations. Building a mobility solution
that is mostly infrastructure-free will better empower end hosts
and users than schemes like Mobile IP. We wish to scope our
protocol changes so that they leave IP untouched and do not
add any complexity to the processing or routing of individual
packets within the network.
2.2 Secure to Remote Redirection
We call a “remote redirection” attack, one in which an at-
tacker is able to forge an update to the location management
system and cause new connections for a victim mobile node to
be forwarded to some other location. The new location could
be an innocent bystander, a malicious node, or non-existent
host; the point is that new connections will not reach the vic-
tim itself. By remote attacks, we specifically mean ones that
do not involve otherwise compromising or controlling the lo-
cation management system, aside from forging some updates
to it that are accepted.
The means of making the location management system ro-
bust to forged updates is itself important. For instance, cryp-
tographic means with well accepted cryptographic primitives
are preferable to less rigorous means. Public key cryptosys-
tems are more desirable than those based on symmetric keys,
as they prevent a compromise of the location manager from
requiring rekeying of all managed mobile nodes. We do not
see establishing key pairs as a problem, as users and hosts are
likely to require these for other purposes, and preestablished
keying material may be reused.
2.3 Location Privacy
A number of issues related to protection of a mobile node’s
identity and exact physical location are grouped together un-
der the term “location privacy.” Location privacy consists of
several sub-issues, which are of widely varying importance
to individuals depending on their threat models. Other doc-
uments go into greater detail on the exact problem statements
and threat models [13, 12], while we provide only a brief de-
scription of how location privacy problems manifest in a trans-
port layer mobility environment.
There are concerns over the information that a node’s
topologically-correct IP address can reveal about its geographic
location. While a mobile node intends to update a location
manager with its current information, it may be desirable to
withhold information that would reveal changes in its exact
location from corresponding nodes. Essentially, the corre-
sponding node should be able to reach the mobile node without
gaining any specific information about where it is. Indirection
methods such as i3 [27] or onion routing systems [7] allow a
node’s actual location to be shielded. However, such schemes
can add a considerable amount of overhead, latency, and cost
making them overkill for for the general use case.
In a transport layer mobility architecture, corresponding nodes
with active connections see mobility events and location changes
as a mobile node moves, without consulting the location man-
agement system. In some network layer mobility systems, like
Mobile IP without route optimization, mobility events and ex-
act location can be better hidden from corresponding nodes,
since each packet travels through the location management
system. The assumptions about the problems and threat mod-
els in both systems are quite different with regard to actively
corresponding nodes, but similar with regards to preventing
monitoring and data collection. We use the terms “lookup-
based” and “indirection-based” to distinguish between whether
location management is performed per connection or per packet.
Whether a lookup-based or indirection-based location man-
ager is used, location privacy needs might require that only
certain specific entities are able to determine a node’s location,
or that entities can be explicitly forbidden from accessing this
information. Informing the mobile node of what queries have
been made could also prove useful. These mechanisms can be
implemented by some form of access control list and logging
facility in the location manager. However, the scalability and
utility of the approach is limited to only a subset of users.
Some work in network layer mobility has involved protect-
ing the identity of a mobile node from eavesdroppers perform-
ing data collection. In this situation, the location privacy con-
cerns are nearly identical between lookup-based and indirection-
based systems. Threats here come from either passively mon-
itoring transmissions or setting up rogue access points. In ei-
ther case, we believe that good solutions to protect identity
problems can occur outside of the mobility architecture, and
we do not further consider these concerns in this document.
The mobile user may benefit from the ability to dynami-
cally alter what specific network resource is being used for
location management. For example, Mobile IP users depend
entirely on their home network’s home agents. Lookup-based
location management, however, can be provided by a number
of independent competitive parties. The ability for users to
choose their location manager can help mitigate privacy con-
cerns that involve the service provider’s interests or motives.
Also, a more distributed system makes it more difficult to per-
form denial of service by directing attacks at a node’s location
management system.
2.4 Scalable to the Future
We mean several different things under the umbrella goal
of “scalable to the future.” Foremost, we need a solution that
works with both IPv4 and IPv6 locators, both individually and
simultaneously (for dual-stack hosts). This ensures that the
system will work both now and throughout the foreseeable fu-
ture. We could generalize this desire to say that the system
should be able to easily accommodate new types of locators,
such as how DNS has been adapted to handle IPv6.
We also need a location manager that can handle the current
number of mobile Internet nodes and be capable of scaling to
the much larger number of mobile nodes that are expected to
be present in the future. The system should be able to deal with
nodes that have many locators and identifiers. This anticipates
and allows for both increased end-user multihoming and more
identity-based communications in the future. We would not
like any artificial limitations based on present usage.
Employed security mechanisms should use cryptographic
algorithms that are at least accepted by the community as be-
ing best current practices. For example, AES instead of DES.
The system should also be easily retooled for new crypto-
graphic methods, such as upgrading from RSA-based to el-
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liptic curve-based primitives.
2.5 Operable Under Legacy Paradigms
Due to the value inherent in the large base of already ex-
isting application software, it is important that the initial res-
olution step through the location management system be per-
formed in a way that is consistent with how current applica-
tions are written. Since nearly all present applications use a
DNS resolution of a user-provided octet string into a loca-
tor set, this requirement should be easily met for any loca-
tion management system that uses identifiers similar to domain
names. This would at least allow the present user interfaces
for inputting identifiers and most of the internal identifier han-
dling to remain the same. In the worst case, all that we would
require of applications is to adopt another mapping function
than the common gethostbyname(), although even this level of
modification is possible to avoid.
We could avoid modifying existing applications at all, by
simply having the resolvers called within gethostbyname() sup-
port the location manager selected for transport layer mobil-
ity. For instance, on many systems other mapping services
aside from DNS are already accessible through the gethostby-
name() interface, such as “/etc/hosts” files, or the YP, NIS+,
and LDAP directories. Adding support for a location manager
for transport layer mobility to this system is a relatively trivial
extension.
2.6 Convergence Time
A key to evaluating any mobility architecture is understand-
ing its convergence behavior in response to updates, or how
quickly old routes are globally replaced by up-to-date routes.
For in-progress connections, transport layer mobility has po-
tentially good convergence properties, since communicating
end hosts receive binding updates immediately. It is also im-
portant that the location management system respond quickly
to a location update in order for future connections to correctly
reach a mobile node.
Since distributing directories across multiple nodes is a com-
mon way to make lookup systems robust and reduce latency, a
mobile node’s location information may be cached at various
places in the network. There is usually a time-to-live value
associated with cached entries that dictate how long they are
supposed to persist. Time-to-live values for mobile nodes’ lo-
cations will necessarily be quite short in comparison to other
objects. These short values can make some lookup systems
seem slow, because they often prevent the local caches from
being consulted and result in more transactions across a higher
latency path, to a busier node. For this reason, implementers
have sometimes been known to be lax in obeying short time-
to-live directives. This implementation practice can severely
limit the practical usefulness of a location management sys-
tem, regardless of its theoretical properties.
3. DYNAMIC DNS
The DNS protocol is a mature and ubiquitously deployed
standard in the Internet. DNS provides a hierarchical naming
scheme for hosts and a service for mapping those names into
IP addresses [19]. Names in DNS are usually human-readable
and meaningful text strings. Registration of DNS names and
mappings is currently easily available to end users for nom-
inal fees through a number of providers. In commonly used
client-server applications, users make service requests for a
particular host name, which is resolved through DNS into an
IP address locator. Through this mechanism, end users can be
completely oblivious to the underlying numeric IP addressing
structure of the Internet.
The de facto standard for network programming is the BSD
socket interface [6]. However, sockets themselves are bound
to IP addresses and not to meaningful names. In most typi-
cal documentation for using various socket interfaces, the first
step in opening a socket is resolving a DNS name into an IP
address. In fact, nearly all programs that users touch per-
form this as the first step in any network communications,
since users ask to talk to their provider’s POP mail server at
pop.example.com and their web server at
www.example.com, rather than use the arcane 32-bit or
128-bit numbers that are the IP addresses of those hosts. With
DNS, a host’s location is already transparent to users and ap-
plications.
Since DNS provides a split between host identifiers and
locations, which is already in common usage, it is natural
to consider using DNS for location management of mobile
nodes. This would allow applications that already perform
DNS lookups to find a mobile node’s current location, with-
out any modifications at all to the application or the network
architecture. However, the base DNS protocol does not pro-
vide any automated means for updating the system with a mo-
bile node’s current location. Updates to the directory can only
be made by manually altering a file on a zone’s master DNS
server. This file is not typically accessible for modifications by
normal end users, only by privileged network administrators.
The dynamic DNS extension [29] enables updates to the di-
rectory to be made over the network through the UPDATE ad-
dition to the DNS protocol. This enables the database to be
quickly and easily changed from remote locations. A mobile
host could then gain location management by sending a DNS
UPDATE each time its IP address changes. To prevent DNS
caches from storing stale mappings to the mobile host’s old
locations, it suffices to use a low time-to-live value on the re-
source records. The only major problem remaining with this
system is that the basic DNS UPDATEs have no means for
verifying that the records actually come from the proper mo-
bile host. There needs to be some authentication mechanism
that can assure DNS servers that dynamic updates only affect
records that the sending parties are authorized to update.
Secure dynamic DNS can be implemented using crypto-
graphic signatures on update messages sent to DNS servers
[30]. Two flavors of secure dynamic DNS are available, based
on symmetric key and public key cryptosystems. The symmet-
ric key method is called TSIG and relies on the DNS server
operator and the mobile host to have pre-exchanged the same
keying bytes. Assuming that DNS service is provided by a
third party, an obvious problem that arises with this approach
is that it compromises the key to the DNS operator. Even if the
operator themselves can be trusted, an intrusion into the oper-
ator’s system can reveal all of the users’ keys to an attacker,
making them all vulnerable to redirection attacks.
The second method of securing dynamic DNS is referred
to as SIG(0) and operates using public and private keypairs.
For a mobility architecture, this has several advantages over
the TSIG approach. The DNS server stores public keys and
uses these to verify updates that are signed with the corre-
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sponding private keys, which only the clients possess. This
makes a client’s key robust to any potential compromise of
the DNS server. Although malicious control of the server
might allow redirection attacks, it would not require rekey-
ing after recovery. The SIG(0) system also potentially allows
users to reuse preexisting public keypairs. Users only need to
give the DNS operator their public key, which does not com-
promise their private key or the use of the keypair for other
purposes. Clearly, the secure dynamic DNS extensions would
be required to use DNS for location management of mobile
nodes, and the SIG(0) method is preferred for this service.
For location privacy, the existing DNS system has no fine-
grained control over lookups. A node’s location is either openly
published to the world, or not at all. Using access control lists
(ACL) on inbound requests would suffice to add fine-grained
capabilities to the system, but there is no suitable standard that
dynamic DNS users could use for inserting and deleting ACL
rules, and DNS operators would not be likely to care about
providing such filtration services. In fact, they probably would
not even make their clients’ request logs available to them, so
that clients could monitor who was tracking their location. As
a location manager, DNS offers little in the line of location
privacy.
The DNS directory provides the ability to store more than
simple one-to-one mappings between identifiers and locators.
For instance, one-to-many mappings are possible, where one
identifier resolves to several addresses. This allows DNS to ex-
press hosts which are multihomed or dual-stack which could
allow a node in the transport layer mobility architecture to
move freely between places where distinct diverse network
layers are supported. Also, the one-to-many mapping allows
an identifier to refer to the addresses of multiple hosts, which
could provide the same services as a mobile host in its ab-
sence. During a period of disconnection, it might be useful
to have other backup hosts able to fill-in for the mobile host.
DNS also allows for many-to-one mappings, where a number
of identifiers resolve to the same locator. This is somewhat
useful in allowing nodes to provide several contexts for hu-
mans to think of or remember them in.
Recent research into DNS response caching has shown that
convergence after updates is very poor in practice [22]. This
stems from implementations of caching DNS servers and DNS
clients that fail to properly obey the specification and honor
the lifetimes of records. As the community becomes aware
of this software problem, future releases of DNS implementa-
tions should (hopefully) not exhibit this poor behavior. Until
update convergence can be improved in practice, stale records
floating around the network can cause problems for mobile
hosts that use DNS as a location manager.
4. SESSION INITIATION PROTOCOL
The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [24] has been pro-
posed for use in various mobility schemes [25, 2]. SIP is a
protocol for signaling the information needed to setup connec-
tions between applications. It includes features for negotiat-
ing capabilities and locating and authenticating users. SIP is
standardized by the IETF, and implementations are available
from a number of vendors. SIP identifiers resemble email ad-
dresses and refer to users or services with particular grouping
domains. SIP servers are currently used by a handful of ap-
plications for proxying and redirecting connection attempts.
Although SIP is not yet as ubiquitous a part of the identifier to
locator resolution process as DNS, it is fairly similar in basic
function.
Existing literature contains good examples of how SIP can
be used to support various mobility scenarios [25]. For in-
stance, assume host A wishes to start a connection with host
B. Each of these hosts has an SIP server (SIP-A and SIP-B)
that stores its location state, and acts as a proxy on their behalf
in performing lookups. Host A initially contacts SIP-A and
tells it that it would like to start a session with host B. SIP-A
then contacts SIP-B with this information. SIP-B pages host B
at its current location and notifies it of A’s request. The success
or failure of this process propagates back through both proxies
to host A. If successful at this point, hosts A and B become
directly connected, and the redirection through the SIP servers
ends. The lookup proxy is a reasonable feature because it re-
moves from end hosts, the burden of performing some of the
more complex lookup scenarios that SIP supports.
It has been noted that SIP can be used for paging, to pro-
vide support for micro-mobility within a domain. This is ac-
complished via registering the mobile host’s current location
as a multicast address and can also be implemented in a DNS-
based system by similar means. However, hierarchically ar-
ranged SIP servers can be used to implement paging with in-
creasing scope, which would not be possible within a purely
DNS-based system. SIP can also be used for one-to-many or
many-to-one mappings, as discussed in the previous section
for DNS, although SIP can potentially encode more informa-
tion about each locator than DNS.
SIP alone, without any transport layer modifications, can
be used to provide application-layer mobility. Mobile nodes
are reachable for new connections through SIP-based conn-
ection setup, but TCP-based applications will have their con-
nections broken each time a location change takes place. Ap-
plications can handle mobility events themselves by imple-
menting a means of restarting connections that are broken mid-
way through an exchange. For example, the HTTP Range
header can be used to specify exactly which portions of a file
were not received before the mobility event and efficiently re-
cover them. This approach requires adding significant com-
plexity to application software and, in some cases, extending
application protocols. For these reasons, it might be better
to add some rebinding capability into transports rather than
force connection and exchange scope re-establishment onto
the transport.
Location privacy is somewhat sketchy as hosts become di-
rectly connected after the proxies set up the connection, thus
revealing their location. This feature can be disabled, but re-
quiring the SIP proxy for all communications suffers from the
same scalability and vulnerability issues that a Mobile IP home
agent bears. A key difference between location privacy con-
cerns in SIP and DNS is that SIP can be configured to operate
in either a lookup or indirection-based fashion.
Support for existing applications is spotty, in that a few spe-
cific applications already use SIP, but the vast majority do not.
For those that do not, the mapping between SIP and DNS iden-
tifiers is not exactly direct.
Cellular SCTP is an example of a transport layer mobility
scheme that uses SIP for location management [2]. Cellular
SCTP leverages SCTP’s built-in address management features
to provide mid-connection (or association) binding updates
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and relies on SIP to look up the current location of a mobile
node when initiating a connection. The SIP component could
easily be replaced with some other location management sys-
tem.
Although it doesn’t require home agents like Mobile IP, SIP
proxies are needed within the network infrastructure, similar
to the need for DNS servers for a dynamic DNS-based loca-
tion management system. Unlike DNS, SIP servers are not
yet widely and easily available to all users, although this may
change. Deploying SIP services on a scale similar to DNS is
an infrastructure requirement for a SIP-based location man-
agement system. The problem of converting a large number
of preexisting applications to use SIP identifiers and perform
SIP resolution before opening connections (and additionally
specifying that all new applications will do this) is an even
larger barrier. Although SIP is an attractive location manager,
the required application changes seem to make it a currently
impractical approach for supporting legacy applications.
SIP transactions can involve caches at multiple points. If
SIP software is not well-implemented, this could lead to sim-
ilar practical convergence problems that DNS currently faces.
Without more operational SIP use and data-gathering, as has
been performed for DNS, it is not currently possible to accu-
rately predict if SIP will have convergence problems.
5. RELIABLE SERVER POOLING
The Reliable Server Pooling (RSERPOOL) working group
within the IETF has been chartered to develop an architec-
ture and protocols to handle management and lookup in server
pools for applications with high availability and scalability re-
quirements [28]. The basic idea is to have a way to lookup
an available server from a list of those providing some ser-
vice. The list is dynamically maintained as new servers be-
come available and old ones go offline. While location man-
agement for mobile nodes is not specifically a goal, the dy-
namic update and lookup functions are exactly what is re-
quired of a location manager. In this case, a server pool would
consist solely of a mobile node, and perhaps any alternative
nodes that could suffice in the interim if the mobile node is
temporarily offline.
The RSERPOOL system would insert the mobile node’s
new location every time it registered at a new address and re-
move old locations as it became unreachable at previous ad-
dresses. The RSERPOOL framework consists of two proto-
cols: Endpoint Name Resolution Protocol (ENRP) and Ag-
gregate Server Access Protocol (ASAP). ENRP is used within
the network of servers that store the mappings, while ASAP is
used by pool elements to update their entries and by clients to
perform lookups. Locators are added to the pool via requests
from the individual servers. Locators are removed from the
pool when they are either explicitly unregistered or experience
a heartbeat mechanism timeout. Mutual authentication, us-
ing TLS and certificates, in the registration and deregistration
functions defends the system from remote redirection attacks.
The required heartbeat responses, however, might be annoying
to mobile nodes who wish to conserve power.
From a security standpoint, RSERPOOL’s use of TLS is a
good idea. The TLS code will generally be implemented in
a library outside the RSERPOOL code, which can be easily
updated or patched in response to any new vulnerabilities or
to add support for new cryptographic primitives. Since many
other applications use TLS, there are robust and easily ob-
tainable implementations, which are highly likely to be main-
tained. The TLS protocol itself is actively maintained by the
IETF and should deal promptly with both new threats and new
(stronger) security primitives.
There are some fundamental differences in the designs of
RSERPOOL and DNS [17]. This makes the support for the
legacy resolution paradigm poor and makes RSERPOOL look
like an ill fit for our goals. The identifiers provided by RSER-
POOL, called “pool handles,” are unformatted octet strings.
Except for a few special cases, pool handles differ from do-
main names in several problematic ways. For instance, pool
handles in RSERPOOL are not intended to be globally unique,
which means resolution of them in a global location manage-
ment system could be ambiguous. Also, pool handles are not
necessarily long-lived identifiers, as we intend for host iden-
tities to be. Finally, RSERPOOL handles are not intended
to be used, parsed, or remembered by human readers, and
thus, some conversion step from human-formatted identifiers
to RSERPOOL handles would be required. In many ways the
goals of RSERPOOL exceed those of a simple location man-
ager. For instance, ASAP provides means for clients to be
updated when a pool changes.
In comparison to the other location management methods
that this document considers, RSERPOOL is more difficult
to evaluate, because its specifications have not yet been fully
agreed upon and finalized. The main features that the final pro-
tocol will have are clear though, and we can evaluate RSER-
POOL for our purposes based on these. The security provided
to location updates is strong, but location privacy is weak.
To legacy applications, RSERPOOL’s problems are similar to
those of SIP and perhaps even worse, given that no current ap-
plications use RSERPOOL and at least some use SIP. RSER-
POOL is potentially much more fault-tolerant than any of the
other location management systems that we discuss here. This
makes it a good choice for scaling to a large and highly mobile
Internet, but the combination of shortcomings detracts from
RSERPOOL’s potential for our usage.
Caching of ASAP query results has been discussed in the
proposed RSERPOOL interface. Depending on implemen-
tation practices, RSERPOOL may suffer from convergence
problems similar to DNS. However, it is impossible to judge
at this point as development of the protocol is not yet finished,
and thus it is not widely implemented or deployed.
6. CONNECTION SPLITTING
An alternative to providing an explicit location lookup ser-
vice (as provided by DNS, SIP, and RSERPOOL), is to im-
plicitly perform this at a static connection-splitting indirection
node. This is the type of approach taken by MSOCKS [18]
and I-TCP [3].
In these schemes, the single logical TCP connection is split
into two actual TCP connections. One connection moves data
between the corresponding host and the indirection point, and
another connection is established between the indirection point
and the mobile node. This involves making the indirection
point capable of buffering data to deal with mismatches in
the transfer rates between connections. The connection be-
tween the indirection point and the mobile node may run some
tweaked variant of TCP that can deal with disconnections bet-
ter. The required infrastructure is similar to that of Mobile IP,
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although slightly more cumbersome, given that Mobile IP has
no buffering requirements and may immediately and unreli-
ably forward packets.
Signaling between the mobile node and indirection point is
required when the mobile node’s location changes. This could
be secured either through a custom authentication step or via
IPsec. In either case, it should be reasonably easy to prevent
remote redirection attacks with off-the-shelf algorithms and
keying methods.
Location privacy is well supported by a connection-splitting
paradigm. Aside from the indirection node, no other host need
be aware of the mobile hosts current location, and since the in-
direction node can completely split the connection, even tim-
ing analysis on connections should be unable to reveal signif-
icant clues about a mobile node’s location. Since correspond-
ing nodes always use the static indirection node as a proxy
to reach the mobile host, they never have direct access to the
dynamic locator mapping that DNS, SIP, or RSERPOOL pro-
vide.
In research implementations, connection splitting has been
built as a transparent shim in the operating system. Appli-
cations are not aware of it, as the shim simply traps normal
socket interface system or library calls and instead performs
its own proxy-based versions of them. This makes the support
for legacy applications good. However, the scalability to fu-
ture transport protocols is somewhat poor, as both the normal
kernel and shim library must be updated per transport. The
scalability of a large mobile network of such hosts is also ques-
tionable, as the system’s routing is inefficient and dedicated
indirection nodes could be easily attacked or overloaded.
Convergence time of location updates in connection split-
ting is instantaneous, since a single static indirection point is
used. Since there is no distributed lookup system, the cache
consistency issues, which can pose potential problems for the
other systems mentioned, do not exist.
7. CONCLUSIONS
Table 1 compares the location management methods that
this paper describes over the listed evaluation criteria. The
high-level result is that none of these technologies offers a per-
fect fit for our desired architecture. Dynamic DNS, secured
with SIG(0) offers an attractive option, as the only facet of its
evaluation that is unsatisfactory is the location privacy com-
ponent. As future work, it might be possible to explore the
addition of some improved form of location privacy into the
DNS structure, although this may be rather difficult. Conn-
ection splitting is also somewhat attractive, although in terms
of infrastructure and architectural scalability, it is less sound
and less well suited to the goals of the transport layer mobility
architecture.
SIP and RSERPOOL are very similar protocols by our com-
parison metrics. They have similar strengths and weaknesses.
They are mainly questionable choices because deploying their
servers would not be enough to enable them. In addition,
applications would have to be rewritten to resolve locations
through them rather than via DNS. Possible future work to
alleviate this concern might be to formulate a protocol transla-
tion mechanism that would map DNS lookups to SIP or RSER-
POOL lookups. This might be possible to do in a relatively
safe and straightforward way, and would allow the location
book-keeping to be done in a different way than dynamic DNS,
while maintaining compatibility with existing applications.
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Mobility architectures that place complexity in end nodes rather than in the network interior have many advantageous
properties and are becoming popular research topics. Such architectures typically push mobility support into higher
layers of the protocol stack than network layer approaches like Mobile IP. The literature is ripe with proposals to provide
mobility services in the transport, session, and application layers. In this paper, we focus on a mobility architecture that
makes the most significant changes to the transport layer. A common problem amongst all mobility protocols at various
layers is location management, which entails translating some form of static identifier into a mobile node's dynamic
location. Location management is required for mobile nodes to be able to provide globally-reachable services on-demand
to other hosts. In this paper, we describe the challenges of location management in a transport layer mobility architecture,
and discuss the advantages and disadvantages of various solutions proposed in the literature. Our conclusion is that, in
principle, secure dynamic DNS is most desirable, although it may have current operational limitations. We note that this
topic has room for futher exploration, and we present this paper largely as a starting point for comparing possible solutions.


